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NEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Part III—ICTR
by Alexandra L. Wisotsky*

Chamber to take into consideration the practices of Rwandan
courts regarding prison sentences, it does not require the Trial
Chamber to conform to those practices. Thus, the Appeals
Chamber found that a 15 year sentence was proper. The Appeals
Chamber held that although it has the power under Article 24
to change a sentence imposed by a Trial Chamber, it should not
exercise such power in the absence of an error of discretion, or
a failure to apply the applicable law on the part of the Trial
Chamber.

General
In November 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1329, increasing by two the number of judges to the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The President of the ICTR will now select two of the Tribunal’s eleven
judges to sit on the common Appeals Chamber. During 2000,
six indicted suspects were transferred to the UN Detention
Barayagwiza
Facility in Arusha, Tanzania: political leader Kamuhanda, reliIn November 1999, the Appeals Chamber issued a decision
gious leader Ntakirutimana, and military leaders Ndindiliyito release Jean Bosco Barayagwiza following his motion chalmana, Nzuwonemeye, Muvunyi, and Sagahutu.
lenging the legality of his arrest and detention. The Appeals
From December 1, 1999, to December 31, 2000, the Appeals
Chamber dismissed the indictment with prejudice and ordered
Chamber issued judgements in the Serushago case and the KamBarayagwiza returned to Cameroon, where he had been arrested.
banda case, and issued a decision in the Barayagwiza case, one
The decision was based on violations of Barayagwiza’s rights as
of several interlocutory appeals. It
a result of the length of his detenheard oral arguments in the appeals
tion without charge or appearance
The Appeals Chamber revoked
of both Akayesu and Kayishema &
before the Tribunal. After a request
Ruzindana, although no judgements
by the Prosecutor, a somewhat difBarayagwiza’s release and determined that
have yet been rendered. The ICTR
ferently constituted Appeals Chamviolations of his rights should be remedied
Trial Chambers rendered judgeber reviewed the initial decision.
at trial. If found guilty, Barayagwiza will
ments on the merits in the RutaBased on new evidence, the Appeals
ganda and Musema cases, and one
Chamber reversed its decision on
serve a reduced sentence; if acquitted,
judgement after a guilty plea in the
March 31, 2000, in Barayagwiza v.
he will receive financial compensation.
case against the Belgian national,
The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19Ruggiu. The trial was completed in
AR72.
the Bagilishema case, but no judgeThe Prosecutor requested review
ment has yet been delivered. At the end of 2000, ongoing propursuant to Article 25 of the Statute, and Rules 120 and 121 of
ceedings before the ICTR Trial Chambers included the case
the Rules of the Tribunal. Article 25 permits either party to subagainst Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe (known as
mit a request to review a decision if a new fact was discovered
the “Cyangugu” case), the Semanza trial, and the trial against
that was not known at the time of the proceedings and could
Barayagwiza, Nakimana, and Ngeze (known as the “Media”
have been a determinative factor in the decision. Rule 120
trial).
allows either party to move the Tribunal to reconsider or review
its judgement where a newly discovered fact was not known to,
and could not have been discovered through due diligence
Appeals Chamber
by, the moving party at the time of the initial proceedings.
Serushago
Rule 121 requires that the Tribunal review and revise its judgeOmar Serushago pled guilty to genocide and crimes against
ment if it finds the new fact could have been outcome deterhumanity (murder, extermination, and torture), and was senminative.
tenced by Trial Chamber I to 15 years imprisonment in February
The Appeals Chamber considered the distinction between
1999. Serushago appealed his sentence before the Appeals
“genuinely new facts which may justify review and additional eviChamber, which upheld the Trial Chamber in a written decidence of a fact” previously considered, and held that a new fact
sion on April 6, 2000, in the case of Omar Serushago v. The Prosmay be one that occurred prior to the trial. Next, the Appeals
ecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A.
Chamber found that the Article 25 right to appeal attaches
The Appellant argued that the imposed sentence should
after a conviction as well as after the dismissal of a preliminary
be reduced because the Trial Chamber failed to give due weight
motion before a Trial Chamber. Additionally, although a request
to the mitigating factors in the case, and because the sentence
for review may only be considered where there is a final judgewas excessive in light of the sentencing practices of Rwandan
ment, the November decision was effectively a final judgement,
courts.
since it dismissed the indictment, thereby terminating
The Appeals Chamber found no merit in the Appellant’s first
proceedings.
argument. Although Article 23 of the Statute of the Tribunal
In considering the merits of the case, the Appeals Chamber
(Statute) and Rule 101 of the Rules of the Tribunal outline the
affirmed the factual basis of its November 1999 decision. The
factors that a Trial Chamber must consider in sentencing, they
Appeals Chamber divided the detention of Barayagwiza into
leave the due weight to be attached to each to the discretion of
three periods and examined each period to determine whether
the Trial Chamber. The Appeals Chamber held that with respect
there was a violation of his rights. The periods included the ten
to the weight accorded to mitigating factors, the Appellant
months covering his arrest in Cameroon and the extradition profailed to show that the Trial Chamber committed any error.
cedure; the nine-month delay in the request for Barayagwiza’s
Regarding Appellant’s second argument on appeal, the
Appeals Chamber found that although Article 23 allows the Trial
continued on next page
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provisional detention through his transfer to the detention
center in Arusha; and the three months between his arrival at
the detention unit in Arusha and his initial appearance before
the Tribunal.
First, based on the discussion of the ICTR’s extradition
request before the Cameroonian courts, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that Barayagwiza knew the general nature of the
charges against him by May 1996 at the latest. Thus, Barayagwiza spent 18 days in detention without knowledge of the
charges against him. This delay violated the Accused’s right to
be expeditiously informed of the charges against him. The
Appeals Chamber noted, however, that an 18-day delay is far less
onerous than a 10-month delay.
Second, a report by the Supreme Court of Cameroon indicated that while the extradition request was submitted immediately to the President of Cameroon, a delay resulted from
scheduled national elections. Thus, the human rights violations of Barayagwiza in Cameroon were not attributable to the
Prosecutor.
Third, while Barayagwiza was detained in Arusha, scheduling problems with the Defense delayed his initial appearance
before the Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber, however, found that
only 20 days elapsed from the time the Defense initially agreed
to appear to the date of actual appearance. Nonetheless, the
Chamber held that there was still a substantial delay in violation
of the Accused’s rights.
Thus, the Appeals Chamber found that the new facts about
Barayagwiza’s arrest and detention significantly reduced the failings of the Prosecutor, and the severity of the violations of the
accused’s rights. Additionally, the new facts could have impacted
the decision of the Chamber. In light of this, the Chamber
found the remedy issued in the November 1999 order was disproportionate to the events. The Appeals Chamber revoked
Barayagwiza’s release and determined that violations of his
rights should be remedied at trial. If found guilty, Barayagwiza
will serve a reduced sentence; if acquitted, he will receive financial compensation.
Trial Chambers
Rutaganda
On December 6, 1999, Trial Chamber I sentenced Georges
Rutaganda to life imprisonment in The Prosecutor v. Georges
Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T. Rutaganda was charged with genocide, crimes against humanity
(extermination and murder), and violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions (murder). He pled not guilty
on all counts.
The Trial Chamber found that Rutaganda, second vice-president of the youth wing of the Interahamwe, participated in violence against Tutsis by distributing weapons to members of the
Interahamwe, ordering the killing of Tutsi civilians and refugees,
and forcibly transferring Tutsi refugees. The Trial Chamber also
found that Rutaganda personally killed Emmanuel Kayitare, a
Tutsi refugee. Although the Interahamwe separated Tutsis at
roadblocks and took them to Rutaganda’s garage, it was not
established that Rutaganda himself erected and stationed Interahamwe members at roadblocks near his garage.
Rutaganda was charged with individual criminal responsibility
under Article 6(1) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber found that
responsibility under Article 6(1) is incurred either as a principal, or for the acts of others, and that responsibility results
from the planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or aiding

and abetting of a crime punishable under Articles 2-4 of the
Statute. Participation includes an unlawful act or a failure of a
duty to act. Because attempted genocide (Article 2(3) of the
Statute) is an inchoate crime, individual criminal responsibility is incurred regardless of the result.
With respect to the genocide charge, the Trial Chamber
held that the special “genocidal” intent of the perpetrator is
inferred from evidence such as the scale and general nature of
the crimes, and the Accused’s patterns of conduct. Given the
widespread violence against Tutsis throughout Rwanda and
Rutaganda’s participation in, and authorization of, attacks
against Tutsis, the Chamber held him individually criminally
responsible under Article 6(1).
In considering the charges of crimes against humanity, the
Trial Chamber addressed the issue of cumulative charges arising
from the same acts. Adopting the test in the Akayesu Judgement,
the Trial Chamber held that a perpetrator may be convicted for
multiple offenses relating to the same set of facts where the
offenses have different elements, where the laws protect different interests, or where it is necessary to record a conviction for
both offenses in order to fully describe the acts. The Prosecutor
indicted Rutaganda on one count of extermination and three
counts of murder as crimes against humanity. The primary difference between the two crimes is that murder involves the intentional killing of a person, while extermination is a crime against
a group of people and requires an element of mass destruction
that is not necessary for murder. Because murder and extermination share the same elements, and the count of extermination
and one of the counts of murder arose from the same act, the Trial
Chamber chose to hold Rutaganda responsible only for extermination with regards to that act. The Trial Chamber did, however, find Rutaganda guilty of murder as a crime against humanity for other acts, namely aiding and abetting in the detention of
Tutsis and killing Emmanuel Kayitare, a Tutsi refuge.
Finally, the Trial Chamber considered the applicability of
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, punishable
under Article 4 of the Statute. Given the nature of the conflict,
the Trial Chamber adopted the “evaluation test,” under which
the intensity and organization of the parties to the conflict are
considered in order to determine whether an armed conflict
existed. There must also be a nexus between the Accused’s
acts and the armed conflict. The Trial Chamber found that an
internal armed conflict existed at the time of Rutaganda’s acts,
the population under attack was protected, and Rutaganda
had sufficient authority to be held responsible under Article 4.
The Trial Chamber was not convinced, however, that Rutaganda acted in support of the armed conflict. Nor could the Trial
Chamber rely solely on the finding of genocide to establish violations of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II. Thus, Rutaganda was acquitted on the war crimes charges.
In sentencing Rutaganda to life imprisonment, the Trial
Chamber considered the seriousness of the crimes, his position
of authority, his leading role in the execution of the crimes, and
his lack of remorse.
Musema
On January 27, 2000, Trial Chamber I sentenced Alfred
Musema to life imprisonment, in Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, The
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema. Musema was indicted for genocide,
complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes
against humanity (extermination, murder, rape, and “other
inhumane acts”), and violations of Protocol II and Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. He pled not guilty on all
counts.
continued on next page
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Musema, a political and economic leader in his préfecture, was
held responsible for committing, and ordering his subordinates to commit, attacks on Tutsi refugees. He provided transportation and weapons during certain attacks on Tutsis. After
one such attack, he raped a Tutsi woman; whether he ordered
others to commit rape was not proven.
Musema was charged with individual criminal responsibility
under Article 6(1) of the Statute, as well as with superior responsibility under Article 6(3). Superior responsibility under Article
6(3) attaches when the accused “knew or had reason to know”
that the subordinate was about to commit, or had committed,
a criminal act, and “failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.” The Trial Chamber held that those with authority
over others, whether military or civilian, may incur superior criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian

The Trial Chamber found that by virtue of
his position, Musema held effective control
over the events alleged, and that he had the
ability and responsibility to take reasonable
measures to prevent or punish the
perpetrators of crimes. Thus, Musema
could incur both individual and superior
criminal responsibility under Articles 6(1)
and 6(3) of the Statute.

in the acts, and his failure to use his authority to take reasonable
measures to prevent the crimes or punish the perpetrators.
Ruggiu
On June 1, 2000, Trial Chamber I issued its written decision
in The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, following a guilty plea entered by the Accused. This case marks the
first against a European involved in the Rwandan conflict.
As a Belgian journalist, Ruggiu broadcast discriminatory and
threatening remarks against Tutsis, moderate Hutus, and Belgians,
knowing that these broadcasts would incite mass violence. Ruggiu pled guilty to direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute, and to crimes against
humanity (persecution) under Article 3(h) of the Statute.
The Trial Chamber considered the nature and gravity of the
crimes, the use of mass media as a tool to mobilize and incite
the population to commit crimes and encourage ethnic hatred
and violence, and the extent of Ruggiu’s involvement. The
Trial Chamber found, however, that Ruggiu was a subordinate
at the radio station and played no part in making editorial policy. The Trial Chamber further considered that Ruggiu’s guilty
plea and cooperation with the Prosecution showed a desire to
take responsibility for his acts. Moreover, Ruggiu expressed
remorse for his acts. After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Trial Chamber sentenced Ruggiu to
12 years on each count, to be served concurrently.
*Alexandra L. Wisotsky is a 1997 graduate of the Washington College of Law and a lawyer associated with the War Crimes Research Office.

Part IV — ICTY (2001)
by Kelly D. Askin*

law. A civilian may be convicted of superior responsibility only
where he had either de jure or de facto control over the persons
committing the violations. The Trial Chamber found that by
virtue of his position, Musema held effective control over the
events alleged, and that he had the ability and responsibility to
take reasonable measures to prevent or punish the perpetrators
of crimes. Thus, Musema could incur both individual and superior criminal responsibility under Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the
Statute.
Musema was found guilty of participating or aiding in some
of the attacks against Tutsi refugees, but he was not found
guilty of all the acts alleged. Complicity in genocide, the Trial
Chamber held, requires the accomplice to have knowingly or
voluntarily associated himself with the principal who committed the act. Since it is impossible to act as both the principal and
the accomplice in the commission of an act, the Trial Chamber
held that Musema could not be held responsible for both genocide and complicity in genocide on the same facts. The Trial
Chamber found Musema to have acted with genocidal intent.
Additionally, as his acts were consistent with the ongoing pattern of widespread and systematic attacks on the Tutsi civilian
population, Musema was also found guilty of crimes against
humanity for extermination and rape. The Prosecutor failed to
establish, however, Musema’s guilt of crimes against humanity
for “other inhumane acts” because the allegations required
more specificity than provided. Finally, despite the existence of
an internal armed conflict, the Trial Chamber did not find a
nexus existed between Musema’s acts and the armed conflict;
therefore, he was found not guilty of war crimes.
In imposing a sentence of life imprisonment, the Trial Chamber considered the seriousness of the crimes, Musema’s leading role
20

Kunarac Judgement
Sexual slavery during the Bosnian conflict
The Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have
handed down several important decisions already this year,
though perhaps none is as momentous as the Kunarac Judgement. On February 22, 2001, Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) rendered an historic first in Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case
No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, by finding two of the accused
guilty of enslavement and rape as crimes against humanity for
what effectively constituted sexual slavery. The original indictment was against eight Serbs accused of a variety of sex crimes
committed against predominately Bosnian Muslim detainees in
the municipality of Foca. The indictment alone was unique in
its exclusive focus on sex crimes. This trial was against three of
the accused who had been arrested and transferred to the Tribunal’s detention unit in The Hague: Dragoljub Kunarac,
Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vuković.
Kunarac, commander of a special reconnaissance unit of the
Bosnian Serb Army, was accused of torture, rape, and enslavement as crimes against humanity, and torture, rape, and outrages
upon personal dignity as violations of the laws or customs of war.
Kovac, a sub-commander of the military police and a paramilitary leader in Foca, was charged with enslavement and rape as
crimes against humanity, and rape and outrages upon personal
dignity as violations of the laws or customs of war. Vuković,
also a sub-commander of the military police and a paramilitary
v

v

v

v

continued on next page
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Chamber clarified that it understood paragraph (ii) to include
factors that would render sexual penetration non-consensual or
non-voluntary. The Trial Chamber thus interpreted paragraph
leader in Foca, was charged with torture and rape as crimes
(ii) to mean “where such sexual penetration occurs without the
against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.
consent of the victim.” It stressed that such consent must be
All crimes were linked to sexual violence. The convictions for
“given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed
torture and enslavement were based on evidence demonstratin the context of the surrounding circumstances.” The focus
ing that the victims had been tortured by means of rape or
should be on serious violations of sexual autonomy, which
enslaved primarily to effectuate continuous rape. The outrages
occurs when “the person subjected to the act has not freely
upon personal dignity conviction was based on conduct includagreed to it or is otherwise not a voluntary participant”; factors
ing forcing three girls to dance naked on a table for the soldiers’
such as force, threats, or taking advantage of a person provide
entertainment.
evidence that genuine consent is absent. Indeed, the Trial
The evidence established that the accused physically raped and
Chamber stated that proof of force, threat of force, or coercion
enslaved several women and girls, and had also facilitated rape
were not elements of rape imposed by international law. The
and sexual slavery perpetrated by others by taking victims to
Judgement noted that the relevant factors tend to fall into
locations where they would be systematically raped or by acts such
three categories: “(i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force
as loaning, trading, or selling the women to others. Many victims
or threat of force to the victim or a third party; (ii) the sexual
were gang-raped publicly while detained in various homes,
activity is accompanied by force or a variety of other specified
schools, and gyms before being taken to other locations where
circumstances which made the victhey were enslaved and repeatedly
tim particularly vulnerable or
raped by the accused or other solnegated her ability to make an
diers for periods varying between days
The evidence established that the accused
informed refusal; or (iii) the sexual
or months at a time.
physically raped and enslaved several
activity occurs without the consent of
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute grants
the victim.” The mens rea of rape is
women and girls, and had also facilitated
the Tribunal jurisdiction to prosethe intent to effect the sexual pencute violations of the laws or customs
rape and sexual slavery perpetrated by
etration coupled with the knowlof war. The indictment alleged that
others by taking victims to locations where
edge that it occurs without the victhe accused committed outrages
tim’s consent.
upon personal dignity, rape, and torthey would be systematically raped or by
ture in contravention of Common
acts such as loaning, trading, or selling the
Torture
Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva ConThe Trial Chamber concluded
women to others.
ventions. Summarizing the general
that the definitions of torture under
requirements for applying Common
international humanitarian law and
Article 3, the Judgement, in reliance
international human rights law differ somewhat. Under cuson jurisprudence of the Tribunal, noted: “(i) The violation must
tomary international law, the elements of torture in international
constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian
humanitarian law are: “(i) The infliction, by act or omission, of
law. (ii) The rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental. (ii) The
treaty law, the required conditions must be met. (iii) The violaact or omission must be intentional. (iii) The act or omission
tion must be ‘serious’, that is to say, it must constitute a breach
must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at punof a rule protecting important values, and the breach must
ishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or
involve grave consequences for the victim. (iv) The violation of
at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third
the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the
person.” The Trial Chamber emphasized that international
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.
law provides no privilege that would shield state actors or rep(v) There must be a close nexus between the violations and the
resentatives from individual criminal responsibility, and indeed,
armed conflict. (vi) The violations must be committed against peracting in an official capacity would “constitute an aggravating
sons taking no active part in the hostilities.”
circumstance” at the sentencing phase due to their abuse of
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction
power.
to prosecute crimes against humanity. The Judgement noted that
in addition to the statutory requirement of an armed conflict,
Outrages upon personal dignity
the following sub-elements are encompassed by the crime: “(i)
The offense of outrages upon personal dignity is found in
There must be an attack. (ii) The acts of the perpetrator must
Common Article 3(1)(c) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
be part of the attack. (iii) The attack must be ‘directed against
which prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
any civilian population’. (iv) The attack must be ‘widespread or
humiliating and degrading treatment.” The scope of this crime
systematic’. (v) The perpetrator must know of the wider context
was deemed to require: “(i) that the accused intentionally comin which his acts occur and know that his acts are part of the
mitted or participated in an act or omission which would be genattack.” Applying these criteria to Article’s 3 and 5 of the Statute,
erally considered to cause serious humiliation, degradation or
the Tribunal was satisfied that the prerequisite conditions were
otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity, and (ii) that he
established in each instance sustaining a guilty verdict.
knew that the act or omission could have that effect.” The Trial
Chamber rejected any requirement that the suffering would
Rape
need to be “lasting” or that the accused knew of the actual
The Trial Chamber generally accepted the elements of rape
consequences of his or her act.
that were promulgated in the ICTY Furund zija case, as: “(i) the
sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of
Enslavement
the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object
This trial represented the first time the Tribunal has had the
used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by
occasion to consider the law and application of enslavement as a
the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat
continued on next page
of force against the victim or a third person.” However, the Trial
v

v
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Verdicts and Sentences
Kunarac was acquitted of responsibility as a superior for
crime against humanity. After reviewing the treatment of
crimes committed by persons under his authority because the
enslavement in domestic laws, conventions, and customary interTrial Chamber concluded that it was not sufficiently proven that
national law, the Trial Chamber determined that at the time rel“the soldiers who committed the offences in the Indictment were
evant to the indictment, the crime of enslavement in customary
under the effective control of Kunarac at the time they cominternational law consisted of “the exercise of any or all of the powmitted the offences.” All convictions were based solely on indiers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.” The mens
vidual criminal responsibility, crimes that the accused either comrea is satisfied if such powers are exercised intentionally.
mitted physically or were otherwise responsible for facilitating.
In determining whether enslavement has been established,
Each was acquitted of some charges, usually based on failure of
the Trial Chamber cited a variety of
the prosecution to prove the crime
indicators that could be considered,
or the accused’s responsibility for it
such as control, lack of consent,
beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . convictions for torture and rape for the
exploitation, compulsory labor, and
Kunarac was found guilty on 11
the accruing of some gain to the
counts: three counts of rape as a
same conduct are also permissable as they
perpetrator. “Sex” and “control of
crime against humanity, four counts
too have materially distinct elements.
sexuality” were two of the many
of rape as a violation of the laws or
other factors cited as possible indicustoms of war, one count of enslavecators of enslavement. The Trial
ment as a crime against humanity,
Chamber opined that “[d]etaining or keeping someone in capone count of torture as a crime against humanity, and two
tivity, without more, would, depending on the circumstances of
counts of torture as a violation of the laws or customs of war. He
a case, usually not constitute enslavement.”
received a single sentence of 28 years imprisonment.
Kovac was found guilty on four counts: one count each for
Cumulative convictions
rape as a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or
This issue concerns whether an accused can be found guilty
customs of war, enslavement as a crime against humanity, and
of more than one offense for the same conduct. The Trial
outrages upon personal dignity as a violation of the laws or cusChamber cited the Appeals Chamber Judgement in the Celebići
toms of war. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
case, which allowed cumulative convictions for the same conduct
Vuković was found guilty on four counts: one count each for
provided there are different statutory provisions that have a
rape and torture as crimes against humanity and rape and tor“materially distinct element not contained in the other,” such
ture as violations of the laws or customs of war. He received a
that one “requires proof of a fact not required by the other.”
sentence of 12 years imprisonment. 
Applying this approach to the case at hand, the Trial Chamber
found that Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute have at least one
*Kelly D. Askin is the acting executive director of the War Crimes
“materially distinct element that does not appear in the other.”
Research Office at the Washington College of Law.
It noted that convictions for torture and rape for the same
conduct are also permissible as they too have materially distinct
elements.
v
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than they were in East Timor. India and Pakistan have fought
three wars over Kashmir. Both possess, and have tested, nuclear
weapons and over 34,000 people have died in Kashmir in the
past ten years. Therefore, UN intervention in support of the right
to self-determination is justified in Kashmir through the example of East Timor.
Finally, even if these arguments are not sufficient legal justification, the principles now recognized in international law—
that massive, systematic human rights violations or a lack of representation within an existing State create a right to
secession—support calls for international action in Kashmir. As
outlined above, all human rights bodies unequivocally agree that
human rights are massively and systematically denied in Indianheld Kashmir and that the Kashmiri people have no recourse
within the Indian union for exercising their right of selfdetermination.
Conclusion
The modern development of the right to self-determination, especially in East Timor, requires the people of Kashmir
be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. Security Council resolutions addressing the scope of the right to self22

determination, in combination with State practice, indicate
the right should be implemented through an impartial plebiscite,
thereby enabling the Kashmiri people to freely determine their
future. Finally, following East Timor’s example, if the parties do
not cooperate in creating conditions allowing the Kashmiri
people to enjoy the right to self-determination, the threat to
international peace caused by the mass violations of human
rights in Kashmir provides clear legal justification for international intervention to implement the right. Indeed, until the
group right to self-determination, which the Human Rights
Commission states is essential to the effective guarantee of individual rights, is realized in Kashmir, it is likely the mass violations of individual rights will continue. 
*Amardeep Singh is an LL.M. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and associate editor for the Human Rights Brief.

